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Between Veridicality and Illusion 
Joseph Anderson 
"Why does a movie seem so real? And why do the spokes of a wheel 
turn backward?" These are questions that many untutored film viewers ask in 
one form or another, but my interrogator at the moment was not untutored. 
He was, perhaps, unschooled in theories of film but well trained in the art of 
asking questions-he was, after all, an attorney. 
As a movie viewer, he had no doubt many times been caught up in the 
enchantment of the world created by the motion picture, only to have the spell 
shattered by the intrusion of a stagecoach or carriage wheel that perversely 
rotated in the wrong direction. His lawyer's suspicions had been aroused. His 
sense of reality had been toyed with. He knew that something was not quite 
right. Now he had before him an "expert witness" from whom he would 
extract the truth. 
I squirmed in my chair and perhaps failed to look him directly in the eye, 
for I knew that out of either naivete or, worse yet, practiced lawyer's cunning 
he had come upon a major inconsistency, a central paradox underlying the art 
of the motion picture—its capacity for realism, and its denial of reality. A 
generation of film theorists before me had lined up to argue that the motion 
picture was not entirely realistic and therefore could take its place as a bone 
fide art. Others had argued that the value of the motion picture lay precisely 
in its capacity for realism. I knew that if I ventured in either direction, 
mountains of evidence could be weighed against me. Worse yet, he seemed 
to be asking about more than realism; he wanted an explanation of his 
experience of a motion picture. What could I say or do? I was trapped. 
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I took a sip of coffee, and slowly looked my questioner in the eye. 
Fortunately, I was not testifying before a court of law, but having a cup of 
coffee with my learned friend. Nevertheless, I responded as truthfully as I 
knew how. "They are illusions, both the sense of reality and the wheels that 
rotate in reverse." 
My friend leaned against the back of his chair and lightly brushed his 
moustache with the tips of his fingers. "You have not answered my question," 
he said evenly. "You have merely given me the word illusions, a name, a 
category, not an explanation. A category is not an explanation. What is 
required is a reason, a cause, at least a relationship, perhaps a mechanism. If 
you answer 'illusions' to my questions of why movies look so real and why 
spoked wheels turn backward, then you must explain what illusions are and 
what they have to do with motion pictures." 
I began searching through my pockets for some change for the waiter. 
"We had better adjourn this session," I said emphatically, fearing the answers 
to his questions would fill a book. 
What makes the lawyer's tale worth telling is that although we live in a 
time when crime flourishes, minorities are opressed, women are victimized, 
and evil abounds in the world (and these are things with which he is 
professionally familiar), he chooses to focus not upon the overt content of 
particular motion pictures, but upon the source of the power of the motion 
picture generically-power that he has no doubt witnessed by effect in the 
world at large, but more to the point, a power he has personally felt while 
sitting in the theater watching a movie. He wants to know why a motion 
picture gives him convincing reality in one moment and takes it back in the 
next. Is it something in the picture or something in him that provides this 
push-pull in and out of the world of the motion picture? In his unguided and 
perhaps naive search for an understanding of the great attractive force he feels 
emanating from the screen, he has focused upon the obvious-the interface 
between the film and the viewer-an area that professional film scholars have 
phobically avoided for almost a century. By a strange progression of events 
the longer scholars have studied film the farther they have gotten from the 
interface between the film and the viewer, and, it might be argued, from an 
understanding of the source of cinematic power. 
Hugo Munsterberg, arguably the first film theorist, set film theory clearly 
on a path that would have confronted these questions directly, though it was 
a path that no one chose to follow. Munsterberg had first come to Harvard 
in 1892 at the invitation of William James to help set up a psychological 
laboratory. It was as one of the founders of American psychology that he 
wrote The Photoplay: A Psychological Study, published in 1916.1 What a 
stroke of luck for the field of film theory to have as its founder one of the 
most brilliant and educated men of his day. Specifically, the good fortune lay 
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in that one of the very few people capable of analyzing the interface between 
the motion picture and the mind of the viewer chose to do so. 
Munsterberg was familiar with the the empirical research being done 
across a broad spectrum of psychological areas. Much of it was being carried 
out in his own laboratory at Harvard. The tools of what would become the 
social sciences were being discovered, and they were being put to every 
conceiveable task. The research of the day was a pragmatic enterprise 
dedicated to finding out how things work. Munsterberg brought this interest 
in practical problem solving, along with his specific knowlege of the results of 
scientific experiments in psychology, to the study of film. In doing so he 
demonstrated that empirical investigation can shed light upon the study of the 
motion picture. The outcome of his short but intense study of the interface 
between the film and the viewer is that he redefined both in a way that squares 
with the physical reality of the filmic experience. He discovered that the 
completed film exists in the mind of the viewer, and that the viewer 
participates directly and extensively in its construction. To future students of 
the motion picture he bequeathed the concept of an active viewer. 
Unfortunately, even in Munsterberg's own work the concept of the active 
viewer was overshadowed by his efforts to defend film as an art. In the debate 
over film's status as an art the idea was virtually lost to film study. Even 
Rudolf Arnheim, a psychologist trained under Wertheimer and Kohler, did not 
choose to focus his primary attention upon the processing of the film by the 
viewer. In Film as Art, his only work devoted exclusively to the motion picture, 
Arnheim chose instead to enumerate the ways in which the stuff that makes 
up a movie is not realistic and is therefore (in his view) suitable material for 
art.2 In making his arguments about the nature of film he had much to say 
about how a viewer processes the flickering picture before him. His own 
perspective on the problem was not all that different from Munsterberg's. 
And like Musterberg, many of his insights into how we see motion pictures still 
ring true. But also like Munsterberg, Arnheim bore a great burden that we 
do not share today. He felt compelled to prove that a motion picture was not 
a cold, heartless, mechanical reproduction of reality, but a human creation that 
could take its rightful place along side the traditional arts. 
The first wave of film theory was devoted to the defense of film as art, 
and once film was successfully established as an art, meriting the same 
attention as the other arts, the direction of film theory was pretty well set. 
Enthusiastic young filmmakers and cinéastes in several countries sought to do 
for the cinema what had been done for the other fine arts-to define the 
medium's essential components (as art) and to analyze their manifestation in 
particular works in that medium. 
Theorists as divergent in viewpoint as André Bazin in France and Sergei 
Eisenstein in the Soviet Union chose to dwell upon issues related to how a 
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motion picture might best be structured in order to maximize those aspects of 
the medium which they each believed best revealed its unique character. The 
"auteur theory" that grew out of Cahiers du Cinema in the 1950s also 
underlined the focus on film as an art, asserting that if film is an art, then the 
director is the film artist. By virtue of this logical construct it became possible 
to analyze not only an individual work of film art, but to look at the whole of 
an author's ouevre as in the study of literature, drama and painting. The way 
was thus paved for film, a decade later, to enter the academy in the full 
humanist tradition. 
It might be said that film study flowered for three decades in the 
humanist garden of the academy. But it can also be argued that what was 
once a valuable and necessary nurturance, if film's full potential were to be 
recognized, became restrictive to film study in general and film theory in 
particular. The summer of film study passed and no blossoms remained. A 
tacit assumption prevailed that the subject of film study is film art. Indeed it 
became prescriptive: the film scholar was to take as his subject film art (not 
a defense of film as art, but that collective body of films that by general 
concensus constitutes film art) and provide yet another "reading" of it for his 
colleagues. To proceed otherwise-for example, to ask as Munsterberg did 
about the psychology of film viewing, to look at film from an essentially 
scientific point of view—was presumed to threaten the medium's status as art, 
to lessen its significance and lower its dignity, to deny the aesthetic nature of 
the film viewing experience. 
Yet we are hard pressed to answer even the most mundane questions 
about the film .experience, such as why the spokes of a wheel turn backward, 
without drawing upon empirical research in perception. And we cannot simply 
skip over the basic questions of film viewing in our haste to get to higher order 
meanings. It is becoming increasingly apparent that if we are to answer 
questions about the illusion of reality in the photographed image, the diegesis, 
the narrative, we must be prepared to draw heavily upon work in perception, 
cognitive psychology, neurophysiology and other disciplines concerned with the 
construction of meanings.3 The mind constructs meanings out of whatever is 
an hand—sensory data, memories, expections. In film, the meanings start with 
the interface between a viewer and images on a screen. (Sometimes the 
viewer is the filmmaker himself, but we shall defer this matter until later.) No 
detail of this interface can be responsibly ignored. If we are to understand 
film as well as appreciate it we need to study it from that point of view. What 
the fresh perspective of cognitive science demands is that if we seek a 
theoretical understanding of the process and experience of film viewing, then 
we must begin by temporarily setting aside our concern with film as art. In his 
Art as Experience John Dewey describes our situation most eloquently: 
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In order to understand the meaning of artistic products, we have to 
forget them for a time, to turn aside from them and have recourse 
to the ordinary forces and conditions of experience that we do not 
usually regard as esthetic. We must arrive at the theory of art by 
means of a detour. For theory is concerned with understanding, 
insight, not without exclamations of admiration, and stimulation of 
that emotional outburst often called appreciation. It is quite 
possible to enjoy flowers in their colored form and delicate 
fragrance without knowing anything about plants theoretically. But 
if one sets out to understand the flowering of plants, he is committed 
to finding out something about the interactions of soil, air, water 
and sunlight that condition the growth of plants.4 
It is not bur intention to deny or disregard the aesthetic nature of the film 
viewing experience. We must return to the exquisite color and delicate 
fragrance of the flower. Indeed, the aesthetic experience is essential in our 
effort to understand the totality of the film viewing experience. (It was none 
other than Hugo Munsterberg who observed that the psychological inquiry and 
the aesthetic inquiry belong intimately together.5) But first, we must turn aside 
from the aesthetic and ask some very basic questions. We cannot ask "How 
do we see film?" until we have arrived at a better understanding of how we see 
anything at all. 
For the moment, however, let us consider a second argument that has 
been put forth against a scientific study of film. The objections, unlike those 
of scholars concerned to preserve the aesthetic nature of the film viewing 
experience, stem from a rejection of the most fundamental assumptions of 
science itself, a rejection set forth in spite of the unmatched record of success 
for science in furthering our understanding of the universe in which we find 
ourselves. 
Admittedly, the course of science has not been a straight path of progress. 
It has taken twists and turns and has sometimes backtracked. As Karl Popper 
has observed, it is, after all, a human endeavor like all human endeavors, albeit 
a special one. 
The history of science, like the history of all human ideas, is a 
history of irresponsible dreams, of obstinacy, and of error. But 
science is one of the very few human activities-perhaps the only 
one--in which errors are systematically criticized and fairly often, in 
time, corrected. This is why we can say that, in science, we often 
learn from our mistakes, and why we can speak clearly and sensibly 
about making progress there. In most other fields of human 
endeavour there is change, but rarely progress . . .6 
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Science can be said to progress, and that is part of its claim to a special 
category among human enterprises. It is the specialness of science, its 
uniqueness among human endeavors, however, that some film scholars have 
refused to grant. Science is built upon the assumption that there is a physical 
world and that it can be known by observation. In general, science proceeds 
by the formation of hypotheses about the world which are then tested. The 
tests are required to be open and repeatable, and results are continually 
questioned and re-evaluated. These are rather straightforward assumptions 
and relatively simple rules; so why have many film scholars rejected science 
outright and with it the work that has been done in a wide range of fields 
which might have a bearing upon our understanding of film? The answer is 
clear enough: some film scholars have adopted the view that science is but 
another set of conventions; that its claim to special status is no greater than 
could be made by any culture for its religion or institutions; that science is no 
more than a tool of cultural imperialism with which Western culture attempts 
to maintain its dominance over the rest of the world! While such a view 
apparently has a certain surface appeal, in order to maintain these notions 
advocates must somehow be willing to deny either the existence of the physical 
universe or the possiblity of knowing it. This is not the place for a full 
exposition of the argument, but the fact that film scholars took such a position 
left film study in the predicament in which we found it at the beginning of this 
decade. In the absence of any criteria for establishing the relative accuracy of 
any given theory, we were left with what has come to be termed 
"conventionalism," an attitude which counts all theories as equally valid, all 
signs as conventional, all expectations as solely culturally determined-what 
E.H. Gombrich is said to have identified as "a manifestly absurd relativism.1*7 
Cultural determinants undeniably play a part in the construction of 
meaning in art and in life. (That point has been more than adequately made 
in the last decade.) But to emphasize cultural and social determinants to the 
virtual exclusion of psychological and biological ones leads to exactly the kind 
of relativism E. H. Gombrich so deplored, and to a denial of the possibility of 
the very task of understanding in which scholars are presumably engaged. 
Fortunately, the conventionalists were wrong. While they were 
despairing of the possibility of knowing, research was continuing in the 
disciplines that have come to make up cognitive science. Today, it is indeed 
possible to pursue an understanding of how we see motion pictures and why 
we like them so much, an understanding that can encompass both the passage 
of time and cultural differences. Even if this pursuit requires a long journey, 
it is our only reliable path to new knowlege. 
When a viewer sits before a theater or video screen to watch a movie he 
faces a sequence of images and sounds for a duration of approximately ninety 
to one-hundred-twenty minutes. The precise nature of the sequence is neither 
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arbitrary nor random but of a most carefully crafted order. The makers of the 
movie have often spent many months and millions of dollars to achieve 
perfection of individual elements and overall form. 
It becomes readily apparent that the motion picture / viewer interface is 
not equally balanced, for while a motion picture is created specifically for the 
viewer, the viewer was not created for watching motion pictures. The 
implications of the imbalance, however, are not so easy to grasp. It may be 
helpful to draw an analogy. The filmmaker can be seen as a programmer who 
develops a program to run on a computer that he does not understand and 
whose operating systems were designed for another purpose. His program is, 
however, truly a program rather than either a language or a mere set of 
stimuli. It is a very complex set of instructions utilizing images, actions, and 
sounds, a string of commands to attend to this now, in this light, from this 
angle, at this distance, etc., and to recall earlier sequences and anticipate 
future ones. The program cannot be run on a projector or a video tape 
machine. These devices have no capacity to interact with the instructions—the 
program can "run" only in the mind of the viewer. 
Since the filmmaker/programmer does not understand the operating 
system, he is never sure exactly what will happen with any frame or sequence 
of his program. He therefore proceeds by trial and error. He follows certain 
filmic conventions and then goes beyond them by guessing. He tests the 
outcome (that is, how his program will be handled in the mind of a viewer) by 
becoming a viewer himself and running the program in his own mind. This is 
a fairly risky procedure, because each human mind is different, and different 
sub-routines may be initiated by the same instruction, and different meanings 
may be constructed in each mind. But the filmmaker-turned-viewer is not 
proceeding completely recklessly and irresponsibly, because the "hardware" of 
the mind, the brain along with its sensory modules, is standard. The same 
model with only minor variations is issued to everybody. The basic operating 
system is also standard and universal, for both the brain and its functions were 
created over a hundred fifty million years of mammalian evolution. 
The analogy between the human mind and a computer may serve to help 
us grasp the relationships between the cinematic apparatus, the filmmaker, and 
our processing systems. It also points up just how different our mind is from 
present day computers. Both are capable of computing functions of 
considerable complexity, but the computer which I now employ in writing this 
text is a serial, digital, highly programmable device; the mind is none of these 
things. It is first of all, much more complex. The brain itself is very likely the 
most complex structure in the universe. It processes in parallel as well as 
sequentially, and it frustrates most attempts at reprogramming. (The structure 
and function of the brain may be so integrated that to speak of "hardware" and 
"software" even by analogy may be unjustified.) Yet the brain is not as good 
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as the simplest commercial computer at carrying out tasks like keeping track 
of expenses or balancing check books, and there is little one can do to change 
its capacity or procedures for calculation. But it is very good at guiding our 
movements in three dimensional space, so that we do not bump into trees or 
fall into chasms, and at locating an object of prey precisely in space and 
guiding our arm in the hurling of a stone or spear with deadly accuracy. The 
point to be made is that by whatever device or analogy, we must understand 
that our brains and sensory systems, indeed our very consciousness, our sense 
of self, our mind in all its implications, is the present result of past evolution, 
and for most of the time during which our capacities were being cruelly sorted 
by the processes of natural selection, the contingencies of our existence were 
quite different than they are today. 
The origins of man's visual system vastly predate the emergence of man. 
To move about with speed and agility, and to hunt successfully, a predatory 
animal needed accurate information about the location of things in space. By 
the time man emerged the visual system in predatory mammals was pretty well 
defined, and its central organizing principle was veridicality. This is to say that 
the model the individual constructed of the visual world before him needed to 
be a very close approximation of that world. It had to be accurate enough to 
act upon. The consequences of error were severe. If a predator were not 
correct about the location of a prey in space he would not be successful as a 
hunter. He would starve, his young offspring would starve, and his genes 
would never be passed on to succeeding generations. The cold, indifferent 
process of evolution selected for veridicality in the visual system not through 
purpose but through contingency. 
As the anatomy of a visual system developed (for example with the 
shifting of the eyes to the front of the head as in cats and primates) a kind of 
operating program developed as well. The program calls in part for comparing 
the array of brightnesses in both eyes and computing the degree of 
displacement between the images in each eye! This procedure, known as 
stereopsis, results in the location of an object in space and is very accurate at 
close range. Of great interest to us as students of film is the fact that once the 
rudiments of the operating program for stereopsis are known it becomes 
possible to present a set of instructions to the visual system and predict the 
resulting percept with considerable accuracy. 
Most of us have been to a 3-D movie where we put on a pair of glasses 
which allowed us to see separately with each eye images which were 
photographed simultaneously from two positions set apart on a horizontal axis. 
As we watched the movie we ducked and dodged spears and boulders and all 
sorts of objects that were hurled at us from the screen. We screamed and 
squealed in fright, but we knew it was only an illusion. We delighted in the 
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illusion of three dimensional depth, and the illusion of danger, both for the 
same reason-we delight in the paradox between realism and reality. 
The simplest definition of an illusion is that it is a non-veridical 
perception. In the 3-D illusion we perceive depth when in reality there are but 
two slightly offset images projected simultaneously upon a flat screen. Such 
illusions are particularly revealing about our perceptual systems. Visual 
illusions, like 3-D, result when the visual system, following its own internal 
instructions, constructs a percept which is in error if compared to physical 
reality, i.e. illusions occur because the system follows the "rules" even though 
the resulting percept is in error. To perceptual psychologists, and by extension 
to those of us who would understand motion picture viewing, illusions are of 
special interest because they reveal the "rules" according to which the system 
functions-rules which are ordinarily invisible. By studying the system when it 
makes an "error" we can see the "rules" exposed; by studying the rules we gain 
a greater understanding of how the visual system interacts with a motion 
picture. 
The mind has no direct access to the outer world. The brain itself resides 
in a dark recess inside the human skull and receives only electrical impulses 
from nerve axons projecting from its sensory organs, the eyes, the ears, the 
nose, the tongue, and tactile sensors in the skin. It is precisely the fact that 
the mind cannot apprehend the world directly, but must construct an 
approximation, a model, by systematically transforming sensory input, that 
allows for the possibility of illusion. Illusion at the initial levels of processing 
apparently has no adaptive value. It is a non-consequential by-product of a 
system designed for veridicality. That the system processes inputs from images 
projected on a screen and sounds emitted from a metal speaker according to 
the same "rules" as inputs from the real world allows for the possibility of 
cinema. The motion picture resides in that cognitive space between veridicality 
and illusion. 
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